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Physical Security - Reports

Report TitleBrief NarrativeLink
Economic Analysis of Physical Security at Nuclear Power Plants, INL/EXT-20-59737The Physical Security Pathway aims to lower the cost of physical security through directed research into modeling and simulation, application of advanced sensors or deployment of advanced weapons. Modeling and simulation are used to evaluate the excessive margin inherent in many security postures and to identify ways to maintain overall security effectiveness while lowering costs.Download

Report TitleBrief NarrativeLink
Evaluation of Physical Security Risk for Potential Implementation of FLEX using Dynamic Simulation Methods, INL/EXT-22-70315Overview of lessons learned in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available FOF simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial nuclear power plant.Download
Guidance Document for Using Dynamic Force-on- Force Tools, INL/EXT-21-64214This document provides an overview of lessons learned in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available FOF simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial nuclear power plant.Download
Integration of Physical Security Simulation Software Applications in a Dynamic Risk Framework, INL/EXT-21-64333The overall operation and maintenance cost to protect nuclear power plants accounts for approximately 7% of power generation’s total cost with labor accounting for half of this cost. In the current research, from interactions with utilities and other stakeholders, it was determined physical security forces account for nearly 20% of the entire workforce at several nuclear power plants.Download
Risk-Informed Adversary Timeline Tool, SAND2021-9430This work has a focus on reducing conservatisms in adversary timelines which potentially lead to over protection of a potential attack path resulting in inefficiencies in areas of a plant’s security posture. Applying the risk-informed tool to these adversary timelines may reduce some of these conservatisms. This user guide presented in this report is intended to go over the use and execution of the Risk-Informed Timelines tool and Timeline Builder software.Download
Methodology and Application of Physical Security Effectiveness Based on Dynamic Force-on-Force Modeling, INL-EXT-20-59891The generic framework for modeling FLEX portable equipment is described in detail, followed by a case study modeling an adversarial attack aimed at causing a radiological release by sabotaging the plant’s power supply and its ultimate heat sink capabilities at a hypothetical pressurized-water reactor. Two distinct FLEX deployment strategies, series and parallel, are modeled with distinct timelines.Download
Integration of FLEX Equipment and Operator Actions in Plant Force-On-Force Models with Dynamic Risk Assessment, INL/EXT-20-59510This report presents a modeling and simulation framework for integrating Diverse and FLEX portable equipment performance with Force-on-Force models of a plant’s physical security posture. The generic framework is described in detail, followed by a case study of modeling an adversarial attack aimed at causing a radiological release by sabotaging the plant’s power supply and its ultimate heat sink capabilities at a hypothetical nuclear power plant.Download
Modeling for Existing Nuclear Power Plant Security Regime, SAND2019-12015This document details the development of modeling and simulations for existing plant security regimes using identified target sets to link dynamic assessment methodologies by leveraging reactor system level modeling with force-on-force modeling and 3D visualization for developing table-top scenarios. This work leverages an existing hypothetical example used for international physical security training, the Lone Pine nuclear power plant facility for target sets and modeling.Download
Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program: September 2019 Physical Security Stakeholder Working Group Meeting, SAND2020-0764The LWRS Program Physical Security Pathway held the first meeting of the Physical Security Stakeholder working group on September 10-12, 2019 at Sandia National Laboratories. This working group is comprised of nuclear enterprise physical security stakeholders and the meeting included over 10 Utilities representing roughly 60 nuclear power plants, two staff from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, physical security vendors, the Nuclear Energy Institute, the Electric Power Research Institute, and staff from Sandia National Laboratories and Idaho National Laboratory.Download

Report TitleBrief NarrativeLink
Plant-Specific Model and Data Analysis using Dynamic Security Modeling and Simulation, INL/RPT-23-73490, Rev 1An update on the progress in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available force-on-force simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial NPP.Download
An Evaluation of The Dynamic Physical Security Risk Assessment Methodology for Fleet-Wide Applications, INL/RPT-24-80303This report is an update the progress of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. This report also provides an update to the procedural guidance for the MASS-DEF process and an overview of the generic models available for use by utilities.Download
Special issue on Nuclear Physical Security Risk and Uncertainty AnalysisA special issue of Nuclear Science and Engineering as the first look into performance-based, risk-informed physical security for nuclear facilities.Download